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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN M. KEMPF and MARY B.
KEMPF,
Plainlifjs and Appellants,

Case No. ·
9032

v;.

JACK H. DENTER and OHREA N.
DENTER,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the Respondents do not agree with all of the
statements contained in the Statement of Facts made by the
Appellants, no extended discussion will be made at this time
since the points argued require a review of the evidence pertinent to the issues raised on appeal. However, the Respondents
feel obligated to call attention to the fact that the Statement
of Facts unduly emphasizes claimed negotiations for a period
of 14 to 15 months, that the Respondents continually express
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•

satisfaction .with their purchase, and the claim that the Re
spondents frequently examined the books in some detail. Ar
offer was made and refused in the summer of 1956 and there
after no negOtiations of ally consequence were conducted b1
the parties until the following summer when at the instlgatior
of the Appellant;, new negotiations were commenced. Durin!
the fall of 1957 as a result of the hunting trade, the operatior
and receipts from the business were satisfactory. Howev~.
starting with. the first part of 1958 the gross rffeipts wen:
not as represented and in March and April the Respondent!
became ~uspicious of the accuracy of the representations made
by one of the Appellants, and oi:t May 12, 1958 notiCe was
served upon the Appellants that it appeared that the motel
was sold as ~ result of misrepresentations. According to the
. Respondents they were only able to make a cursory examination
of books, representing a few months operation, which were
not complete or showed any totals of any_ consequence. However, these matters will be disorssed in more detail in the
argument of the points presente<l by the Appellants.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE
CASE TO THE JURY. (Reply to Appellant's Point I.)
Point II.
THF COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS RULINGS ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. (Reply to
Appellants' Point II and III).
,4
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ARGUMENT
Point 1
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE
CASE TO THE JURY.
The first point relied upon by the Appellants challenges
tbe sufficiency of the evidence for submitting the same to the
jury, and contends that the Court should rule as a matter of
Jaw in favor of the Appellants. It is fundamental that if there
is any substantial competent evidence, the case will be submitted to the jury on factual issues. The issues raised by the
Appellants go to the question of whether there was in fact
aetna! reliance by the Respondents upon representations made
by the Appellants and whether the Respondents notified the
Appellants of their intention to rescind within a reasonable
period of time after becoming aware of the misrepresentations.
A. RELIANCE. The main contention of the Appellants

in this regard is to the effect that the Respondents had ample
opportunity to examine the books and records of the Appellants
in connection with their operation of the cafe and motel, and
as a result of such inspection they, therefore, did not rely upon
any representations made by the Appellants. It is hard to
believe that there is any validity to this argument since if the
Respondents had in fact had ample opportunity and did examine
the books and therefore knew the true nature of the operation
of the business for the preceding years, they would have learned
that from 1951 through 1957 when it was sold to the Respondents the business had operated at a loss (Exhibits 19
and 20). It cannot seriously be contended that the Respondents
,j
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would ;sellia cafe and terminate his employm(!nt which nette'
for him during 1956 $7,339.10 ·(Exhibit 23) and knowing!
take over a losing operation.

·Since 'the jury found in favor of· the Respondents, it j
assumed that they believed their statements concerning ar
examination of the books. The Respondents stated that thel
only had an opportunity on one occasion to make a cursoiJ
examination of a few of the items in the books involving th(
operation. This evidence is corroborated by the testimony oJ
the Real Estate Agent who was present and interested tht
.Respondents in the motel and cafe. The testimony of .Mr.
Denter, one of the Respondents, is as follows:

Q. And tel) us what took place in connection with
those books?
A. Well, I ask Mrs. Kempf if that was the booh
And she said this was justfor 1957. That they were
not complete. And I went through them, and the
thing that impressed me the most on the books,
was the salary of $400.00 to $900.00 a month
throughout the year.

Q. Did you discuss that \nth Mr. KernpU
A. I told Mr. Kempf. that if I cut down with my fam·
ily, the salary, that it would help pay my down
payment, my payments each month.

Q. Did yr>u at any other time see any of the books?
A. No si1, I did not.

Q. Did

)'<lu

at

om1·

other time ask to see the boob?

A. In l'J56, "hen Mr. Kempf said that they were in
Richfield .1t that time was the onlv time that 1 ever
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saw the books was in 1957 at one time, and that
was in just 1957 records.

Q. And how long did you take to examine the books?
A. Just a ff:w minutes, because they weren"t complete.
The thing that impressed me most with the books
was the salary of $400.00 to $900.00 a month.
Q. Did discussions and negotiations continue while
you were examining them there?
A. No. They let me look through, me and the wife,
kind of glanced through them. But they didn"t have
any totals on them at that particular time that I
recall.

Q. In other words, you didn"t have any totals as to
what the gross was for that much of the year or
expenses? You could just look at individual items?

A. Yes.

Q. For any particular time?
A. That is right.

Upon cross-examination Mr. Denter again reaffirmed that
he only saw the books on one occasion (Tr. 257).
Again at Page 330 of the Transcript on cross·examination,
the witnesse testified: "1be only time I ever saw any of his
books was just prior to my purchasing and they were incomplete records of the year 1957'" (Tr. 454).
Mrs. Denter testified concerning this same subject matter
as follows:

Q. Mrs. Denter, upon how many occasions did you
come to Ephraim in connection with the proposed
purchase of the Fireside Motel and Cafe?
7
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-·· ··

,;f.

A. Three -times.

Q And woiild );~u be able to tell us in what year
1
those trips were made?
. A. There were two trips in '56 and one in '57_

Q'. During any of those trips, did you_ or your husband

have Occasion to examine the books of the operation?
A. In

th~:

year of '57.

Q. And you only came on one trip in 'J7, is that right?
A. Just one.
Q. And where were those books loc'ated when they
were examined?
A. In the Kempf home.
Q. Any particular room or place in the Kempf home!
A. ln the front room.

Q. Did you or your husband at any time ever examine
books when you were present at the kitchen table?
A. No sir, never.

Q. Was there a discussion before that examination
took place concerning those books with Mrs.
Kempf?
A. Yes sir. l'-lrs. Kempf said that they weren't complete. \\'e were able to look at them, what she did
have there.
Ag.1in on page -i59 of the Transcript Mrs. Denter testified
that t~e bo<)ks were not complete and they only glanced at a
few of the months in 19'>7. Mr. Broome, a Real Estate Agent
and an independent witness, corroborated the testimony of the
Respondents as foll<l\\S (Tr. 164 and 165):
8
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Q. Well do you recall being in the home with Mrs.

Kempf and where some books were available for
inspection ?
A. Yes.

Q. All right, did you or did you not go over with Mr.

Kempf to get some coffee at that time?

A. I do not remember going.
Q. And what discussion took place at that time con-

cerning the books?
A. Well, Mr. Denter naturally wanted to see some of
the earlier books. There was only the, as I recall, the
1957.

Q. What was said about it?

A. Mr. Denter wanted to see them and Mr. Kempf said
they were in Richfield. So of course, they weren't
available.
Q. What about the books that were there. Did you

examine them ?
A. Only briefly.

Q. Were they summarized and complete?
A. No.

Q. What?
A. They were incomplete. They were still working on

them.
Q. Is that the only time any discussion was ever had

in your presence concerning the examination of
books?

A. I think that is the only time we ever saw any books,
yes.
9
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On cross-ex:,aminatioq t.'lis witness maintained hi~ position
as shown in the foregoing testimohy (Tr. 202).
A further fador to be considered by the jury as to whether
the Respondents should have insisted upon securing all of the
bOoks and _exa~ihed them was the testimony Of the Appellant
Mr. Kempf that his wife's health was not good and that was
the rea~lm he had to sell. The Respondent Denter was asked
concernirig this item and the effect it had upon him, and he
stated a~ follows: "I just took Mr. Kempf's word that his wife's
health wasn't at the best and that is why he had to selL" And
again concenling the same subject matter, whether it was taken
into consideration, the following question and answer v.·al
reported:

Q. And that didn't enter into your consideration
buying the business?

1n

A. Well ye~. It had a bearing on it, because I couldn't
understand why a man would want to sell such a
profitable business unless he had a good reason to
sell it. And I figured that that was as good a rea.son
as any, And I know that I would sell my cafe if my
wife were in the same position.

People are normally trusting by nature and are reluctant
to challenge or show any suspicion or doubt as to the veracity
of statements made by other persons. Such suspicion would
have been shown if under the circumstances the Respond~;)'
had insisted upon seeing all of the books. The statement as
tO :Mrs. Kempf's health was more than sufficient to throw tbe
purchasers off guard.
The foregoing evidence wa5 more than sufficient to
10
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warrant the submission of this issue to the jury. The' Court
in Instruction No. 9 (R. 56) instructed the jury as follows:
"You are further instructed that before a fraudulent
misrepresentation is material, the representee must
have had a right to rely on the statements made by the
representor and must have actually relied thereon as
an inducement to his action.
"Therefore, if you find that the defendants did not
rely upon any statements made by the plaintiffs, or
that they made independent investigation themselves
and relied upon their own investigation, you must find
for the plaintiffs and against the defendants."
The issue having properly been submitted to the jury,
and the jury having found the facts in favor of the Respondents, the Court properly denied the motion for new- trial, or
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Respondents were
told that the business would make a net profit of $10,000.00
a year. An examination of the complete books would have
disclosed that there was in fact a loss for each of the years.
Under such circumstances, it is inconceivable that the Respondents did in fact make a complete and thorough investigation
and as a result thereof relied upon the information contained
in the books as contrasted to the representations made by the
Appellants.
R. TIMELINESS OF RECISSION. The Appellants contend that the Court errored in submitting this issue to the jury.
Whether a party acts within a reasonable period of time in
exercising the right to rescind after acquiring knowledge of
the falsity of the representations is a factual question. It is only
in extreme cases where no reasonable minds could conclude
11
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to the contrary is the Court permitted to rule as a matter of
law that the recission wa~·not made timely.
The Respondents made only one quarterly payment on
the contract and that was for the last quarter of 1957. The
receipts for those months were consistent with a gross revenue
within the minimums represented by the Appellants. It was
testified by the Respondents that the hunting season was a
factor in having good business for the months (Tr. 227). At
the expHation of the first quarter of 1957, the Respondents
stated that the business was very, very poor (Tr. 227), and
that in March or April it was. necessary for the Respondents
to cash in four insur;w.ce policies (Tr. 328) and further that
in April or May he had a discussion with one of the Appellants
concerning the payment of a balance owing on an inventory,
at which time he discussed with him the fact that the business
as represented was not present (Tr. 230).
One of the other representations relied upon by the
Respondents were statements made by the Appellant Kempf
that he had no other source of income, other than from the
operation of the motel (Tr.·160, 231). The Respondent, Jack
" Denter, testified that April went by and in the first part of
May as a result of a contact with a customer, he went into
Salt Lake and asked his attorney to make an investigation
concerning employment of the Appellant Kempf (Tr. 228,
229). At the conclusion of that investigation, the Respondent
requested that a letter dated May 12, 1958, Exhibit 8, be sent
to the Appellants. Exhibit 8 discloses that reference was made
to the claimed misrepresentations and that Mr. Denter desired
to cancel and rescind the contract. A meeting was requested
12
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with the Appellants, or their attorney. Ko reply was received
to that letter and on June 2, 1958, by registered mail, the contl ctd was actually rescinded (Exhibit 9). Further testimony
concerning the timeliness and rescission can be found in the
Transcript at pages 227 and 228, 230, 317, and 328. Mrs.
Denter testified concerning the subject matter as follows (Tr.
455):
Q. Mrs. Denter, when did you first know that Mr.
Kempf had another full time job from which he
wa> receiving compensation?
A. Kat until Mr. Denter went into Salt Lake City to
see you, and that was around the last of April, or
the first part of May. I forgot just what time that
you investigated for him.
Since most of the misrepresentations were concerning the
quantity of the business, it would take a considerable period of
time to ascertain whether those representations were accurate
or not. Mr. Kempf, one of the Appellants, admitted that
October was normally a good month for operating the business (Tr. 431). It was only during the first quarter of 1958
that the business dropped sufficiently to cause the Respondents
to become suspicious. However, during the first part of May
a misrepresentation which was either true or false and readily
ascertainable was called to the attention of the Respondents,
more particularly, the fact that the Appellants had another
source of income during all of the time that he operated the
motel. Immediately after ascertaining and verifying this fact,
the letter, Exhibit 8, was sent to the Appellants.
It is well established that a party having the right to
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rescind does have a reasonable time in which to exercise that
right. 53 ALR 2d, 75-7. 102 ALR, 912.
It is further held that the question of timeliness is an issue
for the jury. 53 ALR 2d, 766.
The Court"s instruction on this issue was greatly in favor
of the Appellants. The instruction was as follows:
""You are instructed that if a party to a contract discovers fraud and elects to rescind and have the contract
set aside for that reason, this election must be exercised
promptly upon discovery of the fraud and that any
delay longer than that absolutely required by the circumstances of the party is a bar to relief and constitutes
a defense to a proceeding by the agreed parties; be·
cause notice of rescission must follow promptly upoo
discovery of a false statement."
Kevertheless, in spite of the foregoing instruction, the
jury found as a matter of fact that the rescission was promptly
made after discovery of the fraud and since there is sufficient
competent evidence to submit this factual issue to the Jury
that determination cannot be upset as a matter of law.
As an additional item the Appellants make reference to
the provision of the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the effect
that no warranties or misrepresentations have been made.
However, again it appears to be fundamental law that if the
entire contract was entered into as a result of fraudulent mi>·
representations, the provision referred to is likewise set aside
and is no defense to an action wherein the entire contract is
rescinded.

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Point II.
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS RUL-

11\GS ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. (Reply to
Appellants Points II and III).
The Appellants in their Points II and III make reference
to the admissibility of Exhibit No. 12, statements concerning
a misrepresentation of $60,000.00 gross receipts, and the admissibility of Exhibits No. 8 and No. 9.
A. EXHIBIT NO. 12. Two listing agreements were signed
in connection with the tentative sale of the property. Exhibit
No. 12 was the first listing agreement, and was dated 9/15/55.
Exhibit No. 13 was a second listing agreement, dated 1/24. '56.
In substantially all particulars, the same information is contained on both cards. However, in recopying the information
contained on Exhibit No. 12 onto Exhibit No. 13, the gross
revenue was shown to be $30,000.00 to $50,000.00 as contrasted to $38,000.00 to £'50,000.00. A secretary in the office
of the Real Estate Agent stated that she copied the information
from the earlier listings to the subsequent one and in so
doing, made the change since it was somewhat d.ifficul~
to read the writing on the first listing agreement. Exhibit 6,
a copy of Exhibit 13 used by the Real Estate Agent, was
admitted without objection (Tr. 142). Likewise Exhibit 13
was received without objection (Tr. 302). Mrs. Brown, the
secretary m the Real Estate Office, testified concerning the
discrepancy of the figures as to the gross revenue (Tr. 113).
Mr. Kempf testified that the information contained on the
listing card was intended by him to be passed onto prospective
customers (Tr. 422, 423). Mr. Broome, the·Real Estate Agent,
testified that the information contained on his salesmen
15
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copy, Exhibit 6, was not only given to Mr. Denter, the pur·
chaser, but Mr. Denter in fact read the listing card (Tr. 166,
255). Mr. Denter also testified that he read the listing agree·
ment, Exhibit 6 (Tr. 214·5). The discrepancy between the
two figures was discussed in great detail when another agent
by the name of Swalberg was on the witne;;s stand (Tr. 303·
310). Mr. Swalberg testified that he had entered the infonna.
tion on Exhibit 13, \\·hich was in direct conflict with the testi.
mony of .Mrs. Brown. A specimen of the handwriting of Mr.
Swalberg was procurred and was introduced as an exhibk
It was therefore necessary to introduce Exhibit 12 and Exhibit
13 for the purpose of permitting the jury to insped the same
to compare the handwriting and to test the credibility of the
witnesses as to who copied the information from one card
to the other and how the change came into existence. Never·
theless, all of the information contained on Exhibit 12 was
before the jury without its introduction; more particularly as
cited above, the difference between the $38,000.00 and $30000.00 minimum gross receipts was thoroughly discussed, as
well as the representations by Mr. Kempf as to specific receipts
for specific years (Tr. 423).
Without Exhibit 12 the Appellants had represented that
the minimum gross receipts were in excess of $40,000.00. A
hand bill printed by the Appellants, Exhibit 7, stated "The
gross income for two years is more than the asking price."
The asking price on both listing agreements was $82,900.00.
Consequently the minimum yearly receipts would have to have
been in excess of $40,000.00.
In view of all of the foregoing facts and circumstances,
the Court did not error in receiving Exhibit 12 as evidence and
16
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certainly th~re can be no daim of any prejudicial error even
assuming there was not a sufficient basis for its admissibility..
B. REPRESENTATION OF $60,000.00 GROSS. The
Appellants in their Brief on Page 13 sta'te that the Court
further erred in allowing evidence over the objection of
counsel that statements had been made by Mr. Kempf to one
of the salesmen of Clinger Realty that it looks like they would
make .'i\60,000.00 annually on the place. The truth of the
matter is that this item was discussed with the Appellant
Kempf, the Secretary in the Real :Estate Office, and the Real
Estate Agent, and in no case was any objection made to such
testimony. On pages 66 and 67 of the Transcript .Mr. Kempf
was interrogated concerning this matter and no objection was
submitted by counsel for the Appellants. On Pages 113 and
114 of the Transcript Mrs. Brown, secretary, was interrogated
concerning the subject matter, and again no objections were
made. On Page 158 of the Transcript the same subject matter
was discussed with .Mr. Broome, a Real Estate Agent, and
again no objection was made by counsel.
Counsel for the Appellants contend that a discussion o£
such statements was prejudicial error in that it may have led
the jury to believe that "Mr. Kempf had a propensity to mak~
fictitious statements about the business." There was no question
in the minds of the jury as a result of all of the evidence that
Mr. Kempf had such a propensity. He represented on the listing
agreements that the business netted $10,000.00 per year. How·
ever, a C.P.A.'s exhibit after analyzing the books and the
income tax statements filed by the Appellants, disclosed the
following losses for each of the years in question:
17
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1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1958 (9 months)

$2,553.94
563.15
288.38
913.52
4,264.57
1,567.52
168.63

(Exhibit 19)
Mr. Kempf admitted that on one of the listing agreements
he ;tated th.it the gross for the year 1953 was $50,000.00 and
for 1954 was $11,000.00. In fact his books and income tax
returns disclosed that the gross for 1953 was $30,411.14 and
for 1954 was $30,063.02. In one of the listing agreements the
gross was represented as being between $38,000.00 and
$50,000.00 and on the hand bill, Exhibit 7, it was stated that
the gross for two years was more than the asking price, and
as stated, the asking price was $82,900.00. However, the
gross for all of the years in 9uestion was as follows;
$ 7,135.25
28,080.63
30,411.14
30,063.02
27,280.65
33,369.29

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955"
1956

(Exhibit 19)
Mr. Kempf testified that a discussion concerning his
employment took place in the presence of Mr. Denter, AI
Broome, Mr. Kempf's wife, and Mr. Swalbexg (Tr. 443).
Mr. Swalberg was called as a witness and admitted that he
had never met Mr. Denter and was not present at any con·
versations wherein he was involved (Tr. 106, 107).
18
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Although Mr. Kempf testified that he had discussed his
other employment with Denter before the purchase, this was
emphatically denied by Mr. Denter (Tr. 231), which testimony
was corroborated by the Real Estate Agent, Mr. Broome (Tr.

160).
Mr. Kempf also testified that he did not know who had
the keys to the property after the Denters vacated the same and
that he only received information from the neighbors at a
subsequent time concerning this matter (Tr. 74 and 75). The
Town Marshall, Mr. Sevy, testified that he met Mr. Kempf
on the property, advised him he had the keys and offered to
give them to Mr. Kempf (Tr. 449). There were other mis·
cellaneous representations made by the Appellants such as
the fact that salaries of $400.00 and $900.00 a month could
be paid and still the business show a profit. A $1,000.00 a year
liquor bill was charged against the property, that a substantial
bank account had been accumulated from the operation of
the property, that the receipts had been sufficient to pay for
the motel during the seven years it was operated, and that
the Appellants had been able to buy a new Buick automobile
consistently during the time they had operated the business.
All of these representations were refuted by the testimony m
the case:
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to believe that the
jury was prejudiced by the statements concerning the $60,000.00
received into evidence without objection since it would cause
them to believe that Mr. Kempf had a propensity to make
fictitious statements about the business.
The Appellants do not contest the fact that misrepresen·
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tations vvere made, but rather argue that the Respondents were
not justified in relying thereon. A strong case was made against
the Appellallts in this regard as is evidenced by the fact that
a local jury found by dear and convincing evidence against a
local resident who held a responsible position as a Probation
Officer and in favor of a non-resident represented by other
than Local counsel. Since counsel did not object to the admissibility of such evidence," they cannot claim that there has been
any error, and certainly there can be no contention of any
prejUdicial error.
'

C. EXHIBITS 8 AND 9. Exhibits 8 and 9 were letters
wntten by cOunsel for the Respondents concerning their position
in connedio~ with the property. More particularly, Exhibit 8
is a letter dated May 12, 1959 which refers to the claim of
th·c Respondents that the sale had been made by virtue of
m.isrepreselltations and that the Respondents desired to cancel
and rescind the same. The second paragraph then requests a
meeting with the Appellants, or their attorney. Exhibit 9 is
a letter dated June 2, 1958. The first paragraph actually rescinds
the "contract and in the second paragraph, a tender is made
to return the parties to the status quo. The third paragraph
suggests that during an adjudication of the issues involved
that ~orne arrangements be made for the purpose of operating
the property during the favorable tourist season. Certainly
there is no statement in any of those letters which would be
at all prejudiciaL They were material and properly admitted
to show the timeliness of the action of the Respondents and
to establish the actual fact of recission and the tender of the
property to the Appellants.
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CONCLUSION
The Respondents have in fact actually rescinded the contract. The Appellants have been back in possession prior to
the date of trial and during the time of this Appeal. Not only
have the Respondents been damaged by virtue of their selling
a cafe in Salt Lake and terminating employment, but they lost
$6,073.61 as a result of the misrepresentations which caused
them to take possession of the property. (Exhibit 22).
Not counting the down payment and first quarterly payment a return of which was awarded in this action. The case
has been tried before a jury and the jury has found in favor
of the Respondents. There is no question but what there is
sufficient factual evidence to warrant the submission of the
case to the jury upon the issues raised by the Appellants in their
Brief. Nor i~ there any error in the admissibility of evidence
by the Court. The Appellants have their property back and
the Respondents only seek to have returned to them the downpayment and one quarterly payment made after they were in
possession. The Counterclaim for the additional items of
damage was withdrawn during the time of trial. In view of
all of these facts and circumstances it is respectfully submitted
that the judgment of the jury should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
•

BUSHNELL, CRANDALL & BEESLEY
AttOrneys for Respondents
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